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Question 
A review of the literature on China’s aid (traditional and non-traditional) to developing countries. 
This review will provide a short summary of the available literature, looking in particular at: 
 What are the definitions of China’s aid and what statistics are available? How does 
China define its aid; how does this compare with the OECD definition of official 
development assistance; how do others attempt to identify and measure China’s 
aid?   
 What are the volumes of Chinese aid flows (i) traditional; and (ii) non-traditional, and 
the principle delivery mechanisms? Types of finance and bilateral/multilateral flows. 
 How does China’s traditional and non-traditional aid architecture relate to China’s 
political, economic and social objectives? What domestic state actors are involved, 
with what coordination?  
 What is China’s involvement in aid sectors – including humanitarian, health, 
economic (including infrastructure financing) and socio-cultural (soft-power)? 
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1. Overview 
With China’s expanding global role, its growing aid and economic engagement overseas is 
attracting attention and analysis. Consequently there is a large and growing literature from policy 
organisations, academic researchers and the press on the various aspects of Chinese aid and its 
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economic engagement more broadly, These range from “studies on China’s aid approaches and 
country or regional case studies, to research specifically focusing on aid data or single projects 
or sectors” (Gu, 2015, p.2). 
Given the sizeable literature and the multiple topics covered by this rapid review, this summary 
can only present an illustrative selection of studies and very brief synthesis of some key points 
made in the literature. This review has selected examples of the most recent rigorous analysis 
available as well as some older seminal papers that are referred to often within the literature as 
key texts, and some media reports for context. The search has been limited to literature written in 
English. Gender tends not to be a focus of analysis in the literature selected; this review did not 
use gender as a search term when identifying relevant literature.  
Key findings are: 
Definitions and types of aid 
 China provides grants and interest-free loans (managed by the Ministry of Commerce) 
and concessional loans (by China EximBank) (State Council, 2014).  
 China’s measurement of “foreign aid” differs from “official development assistance”1 for 
example by including military assistance and excluding donor administrative costs. 
 The principal forms of Chinese foreign aid are: complete projects; goods and materials; 
technical cooperation and human resources development cooperation; medical teams 
and volunteers; emergency humanitarian aid; and debt relief (for interest free loans) 
(State Council, 2014). China rarely gives cash aid (Bräutigam, 2009, p.125). 
 China makes multilateral contributions to the World Bank, IMF and UN agencies; 
however, the bilateral share of China’s aid (93 per cent on average over the previous five 
years) is much larger than the multilateral (Kitano and Harada, 2016, p.105). 
 When China provides aid, it is generally a government-to-government relationship, and to 
date China’s “underdeveloped civil society” is rarely used, although experts report China 
has shown increasing interest in channelling international cooperation funds through civil 
society organisations (Zhang, 2015, p.5; Poskitt et al, 2016, p.19, 25). 
 China’s development finance goes “well beyond” its traditional official aid programme, 
including export buyers’ credits, official loans at market rates and strategic lines of credit 
provided to Chinese enterprises, with the two state policy banks – China EximBank and 
the China Development Bank (CDB) – playing key roles (Lakatos, 2016, p.11). 
 The ‘Going out’ (or ‘Going Global’) policy endorsed by the Chinese government in 2000 
has led to a series  of Chinese initiatives – such as the One Belt, One Road initiative and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – which (along with the BRICS New 
Development Bank)  “imply a new economic and political geography of international 
development cooperation” (Carey and Li, 2016, p.13). 
 
 
                                                   
1 As defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). 
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Volumes 
 Tracking China’s aid and other development finance is “a difficult and contested field of 
research” (Xu and Carey, 2015, p.3), with challenges of classification and a lack of 
transparency. As a result there are wide-ranging estimates. 
 There was an “unprecedented acceleration” in China’s economic and development 
cooperation since the introduction of the ‘Going out’ policy. China is now one of the 
world’s 10 largest providers of development assistance. (Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9) China’s 
development assistance is dwarfed by the much larger policy bank lending to developing 
countries. Much of the literature focuses on China’s relationship, aid and economic 
engagement with Africa. 
 Official Chinese statistics state that between 2010 and 2012 China appropriated in total 
USD 14.41 billion2 for foreign assistance commitments: 56 per cent in concessional 
loans, 36 per cent in grants and 8 per cent in interest-free loans. (State Council, 2014)  
 The John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) China Africa 
Research Initiative (CARI) finds that from 2000 to 2015, the Chinese government, banks 
and contractors extended USD 94.4 billion worth of commercial and concessional loans 
to African governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)3.  
Drivers of aid and effect on China’s aid architecture 
 China’s increasing role as a global aid actor and the broader impact of its economic 
engagement overseas is the subject of considerable interest and debate, but its decision-
making process for its foreign aid remains opaque.  
 Various experts find that China’s aid is fundamentally a tool of foreign policy, driven by a 
mix of political, commercial and moral objectives (Bräutigam, 2009, p.15, 17; Gu, 2015). 
A growing literature suggests the conventional wisdom that China gives aid to get access 
to resources is at best a partial and misleading answer (Bräutigam, 2009, p.11). 
 The literature highlights the influence of China’s own past experience as an aid recipient, 
as well as that of the historical context and geopolitics of China’s regional and global 
circumstances (Bräutigam, 2009, p.11; Gu, 2015, p.5). 
 Drivers of initiatives inspired by the ‘Going out’ policy include domestic political and 
economic conditions; frustrations with American-dominated multilateral institutions; and 
soft power objectives (Wang, 2016, p.1; Dollar, 2015, p.163-164; Shambaugh, 2015) 
 Other analyses highlight that rather than a coherent overarching strategy, other factors 
shape Chinese assistance, including: the competition between the multiple domestic aid 
institutions; the role of China’s provinces in driving the process of ‘going global’; the 
informal and decentralised Chinese state-business interaction in African agriculture; and 
the importance of contractors; (Varrall, 2016; Zhang and Smith, 2017, p.12; Gu et al, 
2016, p.1)  
                                                   
2 This is as stated in State Council (2014). Kitano and Harada (2016, p.1052) calculate that the dollar amount is 
USD 13.7 billion using the 3-year average of exchange rates of 0.154 US$/RMB.  
3 http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa  
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Sector involvement 
 Humanitarian: Since 2000 China has been one of the top five largest humanitarian aid 
providers among non-DAC countries (UNDP, 2005). From the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami onwards China’s humanitarian aid “greatly increased” and is increasingly 
provided through multilateral organisations (Krebs, 2014). 
 Health: China has been involved in overseas health assistance for decades and is 
starting to become a major global player in this sector (Bräutigam, 2009; Itad, 2017). Lin 
et al (2016, p.2) found that “a key limitation of China’s health aid approach is the absence 
of a cohesive approach and a coherent strategy of China’s health diplomacy”.  
 Economic (including infrastructure financing): Infrastructure assistance is a key priority for 
China: the largest sector for commercial and concessional loans to Africa during period 
2000-2014 was transportation loans for construction/renovation of roads, railways, 
airports and harbours (Hwang et al, 2016, p.2). Agricultural development is another 
priority: Chinese development cooperation in Africa increasingly includes agriculture, 
involving agribusiness, contract farming, technology demonstration, and training 
(Scoones et al, 2016) 
 Socio-cultural (soft power): There is talk of China’s “recent push” on soft power, with 
initiatives such as the One Belt One Road and trilateral assistance explicitly intended to 
promote China’s image and legitimacy abroad (Shambaugh, 2015; Zhang, 2017). Other 
socio-cultural elements of Chinese assistance to developing countries include training 
(which focuses in part on transferring information about China’s own experience with 
urbanisation, economic growth, and poverty alleviation); scholarships for university study 
in China; the Chinese youth volunteer corps (Bräutigam, 2009, p.122-124). 
There is scope to undertake further research to achieve a more comprehensive review and in-
depth analysis of the literature on the topics covered here as well as related issues. In particular 
further analysis could be undertaken on the strategic drivers of Chinese aid (including trends 
around the principle of non-interference) and the impact on China’s aid architecture; key issues 
for China’s involvement in individual sectors; the impact of Chinese aid on recipient countries and 
their development; and forecasted future trends for Chinese aid and broader economic 
engagement and their impact on the international aid system.   
2. Definitions and types of aid 
Chinese definition of foreign aid  
Chinese defined “foreign aid” (duiwai yuanzhu) differs from “official development assistance” 
(ODA) as defined by the OECD DAC4. Understanding the differences is hampered by the lack of 
transparency of China’s official aid programme (Bräutigam, 2011, p.752). One similarity with the 
                                                   
4 Since 1972 OECD DAC has defined ODA for its 24 members as: “those flows to countries and territories on the 
DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including 
state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a)  is administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and 
b)  is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10 per cent) 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
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DAC ODA definition is that “China’s external assistance is also defined by its concessionality” 
(Bräutigam, 2011, p.755). 
The two white papers on Chinese aid identify three different types of foreign assistance: grants, 
interest-free loans and concessional loans (State Council, 2011; 2014). According to the Ministry 
of Commerce’s (MOFCOM) first departmental regulation on the management of foreign 
assistance: (MOFCOM, 2014; Kitano, 2016, p.5) 
 “Nonreimbursable assistance is mainly used for the aid needs of aid recipients in terms of 
poverty reduction, livelihood, social welfare, public services and humanitarianism, among 
others. 
 Interest-free loan is mainly used for the aid needs of aid recipients in terms of public 
infrastructure and industrial and agricultural production, among others. 
 Concessional loan is mainly used for supporting production projects with economic benefits 
and large-scale infrastructure construction of, and providing a large quantity of mechanical 
and electrical products and complete equipment to, aid recipients.” 
The Ministry of Commerce manages foreign aid grants and zero‐interest loans while China 
EximBank provides the concessional loans. The Chinese government charges all grants and 
interest free loans to their external assistance budget, as well as their interest rate subsidy for the 
concessional loans from China EximBank (but not the face value of the loan)5 (p.755-6). In sum, 
these account for China’s “traditional aid programme” which “corresponds more or less” with the 
DAC ODA definition (Xu and Carey, 2015, p.3).  
There are some key differences in what is defined as aid by China compared with DAC member 
states. China includes military assistance, construction of sports facilities and subsidised loans 
for joint ventures and cooperative projects, which are excluded from ODA (Zang and Smith, 
2017: 2-3; Bräutigam, 2011, p.756). Meanwhile China excludes scholarships for students 
studying in China, costs of some newly arrived refugees inside the host country and donor 
administrative costs of aid, all of which are allowed as ODA under the DAC (Bräutigam, 2011, 
p.756; Grimm et a, 2011, p.7); Strange et al, 2017, p.939). 
Bilateral aid 
According to China’s 2014 White Paper, the principal forms of Chinese foreign aid are: complete 
projects; (with a focus on infrastructure and agriculture); goods and materials; technical 
cooperation and human resources development cooperation; medical teams and volunteers; 
emergency humanitarian aid; and debt relief (State Council, 2014). Looking at the similar list of 
modalities in the 2011 White Paper, Grimm et al (2011, p.9) note there is no explanation of the 
rationale for choosing modalities or of the inherent tensions between some goals and modalities 
(such as between promoting self-help and providing complete projects).  
China rarely gives cash aid “in any significant amount”, with small amounts sometimes provided 
in an emergency rapid response (Bräutigam, 2009, p.124-125). Aid grants do not usually involve 
                                                   
5 Apparently from 2009 the full amounts of concessional loans are included in the announced aid figures, but the 
fiscal budget only includes the subsidies to the loan, not the overall amount, as the capital of the concessional 
loans is collected by EXIM bank (Grimm et al, 2011, p.7). 
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a cash transfer: they “are almost always delivered in kind, as exports of Chinese goods and 
services” (p.125).  
In terms of debt relief, China did not participate in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
debt reduction programme but has since made a series of loan cancellations (p.127-130). Kitano 
and Harada (2016, p.1054) report that “By the end of 2009, China had cancelled debts totalling 
RMB25.58billion (USD 4.1 billion) incurred by mature interest-free loans, which is about one-third 
of what China had committed”. This debt relief is only for the interest-free loans; Kitano and 
Harada “have not found any evidence that China EximBank has cancelled debts incurred by 
mature concessional loans” (p.1054; also see Bräutigam, 2009, p.129).  
Multilateral aid 
Zhang et al (2015, p.32) report that China has been an important participant of a number of 
significant multinational development agencies from 2005 and even before, including the UN 
System, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 2014 White Paper lists the 
multilateral organisations that China has contributed to6 (State Council, 2014). Kitano and 
Harada (2016, p.105) find that the bilateral share of China’s aid (93 per cent on average over the 
previous five years) is much larger than the multilateral (7 per cent). 
Civil society organisations 
China usually provides aid government-to-government; China’s “underdeveloped” civil society is 
rarely used nor does the Chinese government work with recipient countries’ civil society (Zhang 
et al, 2015, p.5). However, there are some changes. Chinese NGOs have begun to increase and 
deepen their international engagement in humanitarian assistance (see discussion in this report 
on China’s involvement in the humanitarian sector) (UNDP, 2015). Moreover Poskitt et al (2016, 
p.19) report that China has shown increasing interest in channelling international cooperation 
funds through CSOs, but note that to date limited progress has been made (p.25). 
Other development finance 
China’s development finance goes “well beyond” its traditional official aid programme (Xu and 
Carey, 2015, p.3). Grants and zero interest loans were China’s main foreign aid instruments until 
1995, but over time, unlike OECD countries, China has “deviated from traditional aid instruments, 
implementing a combination of official development aid and other official financing, via export 
buyers’ credits, official loans at market rates and strategic lines of credit provided to Chinese 
enterprises in Africa” (Lakatos, 2016, p.11; see also Bräutigam, 2011, p.752). The two state 
policy banks – China EximBank and the China Development Bank (CDB) – play key roles in 
lending to developing countries by supporting “large resource-backed loans and associated 
project financing and also help to finance China’s ‘going out’ policy by assisting Chinese 
                                                   
6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
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companies to develop off-shore business and foreign subsidiaries, and capture market share in 
strategic global industries”7 (Xu and Carey, 2015, p.3).  
Effect of the ‘Going out’ policy 
China’s foreign aid has been growing, due to the ‘Going out’ (zouchuqu) policy (endorsed in 
2000) which has also involved increased “outward investment by Chinese companies, the 
promotion of trade and export of products, services and technologies, overseas exploitation of 
resources and infrastructure construction by Chinese enterprises” (Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9; 
Wang, 2016). As a result of the ‘Going out’ policy, Carey and Li (2016, p.13) list a series of 
Chinese initiatives (alongside the BRICS New Development Bank) that “imply a new economic 
and political geography of international development cooperation, with BRICS leadership and 
engagement”. Key examples include: 
 Ambitious strategic frameworks and financing facilities in Africa through the Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation8;  
 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – “setting the stage for China’s greater 
role in the international economic system as a prominent stakeholder”; and  
 The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, aiming to connect China with countries along 
the ancient Silk Road and a new Maritime Silk Road via infrastructure investment  
(Wang, 2016; Carey and Li, 2016, p.13)  
3. Volumes 
Challenges  
There is much misunderstanding and speculation about Chinese aid (Bräutigam, 2009, p.12). 
Tracking China’s aid and other development finance is “a difficult and contested field of 
research”, with challenges of classification and a lack of transparency (Xu and Carey, 2015, p. 
3). There are multiple attempts to measure China’s aid and associated finance, with a lot of 
confusion, use of different definitions. As a result there are wide-ranging estimates of volumes 
(Zang and Smith, 2017, p.2-3).  
In particular there is a lack of consensus in the literature on how to classify the many Chinese 
financial instruments that lack OECD-DAC counterparts, particularly the state owned policy 
banks funding (Strange et al, 2017, p.939; Grimm et al, 2011, p.15). Strange et al (2017, p.939) 
find that Chinese state-owned enterprises blur the line between official government finance and 
                                                   
7 EximBank’s concessional loans are the only part of their operations that can be called foreign aid. In 2009 
Brautigam reported that about 60 per cent of EximBank’s portfolio consisted of export seller’s credits – large, 
preferential loans to Chinese companies operating abroad – while a growing share of its portfolio was for export 
buyers credit, issued to importers of Chinese goods and services (Brautigam, 2009, p.112). CDB – based on total 
assets more than five times larger than the EximBank – does not give official development aid, providing non-
concessional development finance (p.115). It has recent large lines of credit overseas, including in 2007 from the 
CDB China Africa Development Fund, which provides equity investment capital. (Brautigam, 2011, p.756-757) 
8 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, formed in 2000 and convened every three years, has become the 
primary institutional vehicle for China’s strategic engagement with Sub Saharan Africa (Pigato and Tang, 2015, 
p.1). 
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private flows, with foreign direct investment (FDI) or joint ventures coming from both private and 
state-owned firms. Moreover there is confusion on how to define bundled packages that mix 
concessional and market rate finance (p.939). 
Key findings 
In spite of these challenges there are some common findings across the literature: 
 Since 2000, China’s has had “an unprecedented acceleration in economic and 
development cooperation” due to the ‘Going out’ policy (Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9).  
 “It can be safely said that China – itself a developing nation – has become one of the 
world’s 10 largest providers of development assistance”, according to the independent 
expert’s report to the Human Rights Council in 2016 (Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9). 
 A key point stressed across the literature is that China’s foreign aid (that is comparable 
to DAC ODA) is small compared with the much larger policy bank lending to developing 
countries. 
Notably much of the literature on China’s aid focuses on China and Africa. According to a recent 
Mckinsey report, in two decades, China has become Africa’s biggest economic partner with no 
other country with such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa across trade, investment, 
infrastructure financing, and aid (Yuan Sun et al, 2017). 
Chinese statistics 
2014 White Paper on foreign assistance9 
Key data on aid volumes provided by the 2014 White Paper, states that between 2010 and 2012: 
 China appropriated in total USD 14.41 billion10 for foreign assistance. Of this, 56 per cent 
(USD 7.6 billion) was in concessional loans, 36 per cent (USD 5 billion) in grants and 8 
per cent (1.1 billion) in interest-free loans1112.   
 China contributed 1.76 billion yuan (USD 0.3 billion) to multilateral institutions including 
the World Bank, IMF and a number of UN agencies13. It also states that by 201214, China 
had donated a total of USD 1.3 billion to regional financial institutions15.   
                                                   
9 The first White Paper published in 2011 by the Information Office of the State Council has been seen as “a 
response by the Chinese government to persistent criticism about a lack of transparency” (Grimm et al, 2011, 
p.6). An update was published in 2014 (State Council, 2014).  If the intention is to provide an update every three 
to four year (as supposed by Grimm et al, 2011, p.6), then a third update may be imminent 
10 This is as stated in State Council (2014). Kitano and Harada (2016, p.1052) calculate that the dollar amount is 
USD 13.7 billion using the 3-year average of exchange rates of 0.154 US$/RMB.  
11 Kitano and Harada, 2016, p.1052 for dollar amounts. 
12 These figures are for commitments, exclude multilateral contributions and most likely do not cover all foreign 
aid expenditures of other departments, focusing on the Ministry of Commerce and China EximBank (Grimm et al, 
2011, p.8; Kitano and Harada, 2016, p.1051, 1052). 
13 Kitano and Harada, 2016, p.1052 for dollar amount. 
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 China provided assistance to 121 countries, including 30 in Asia, 51 in Africa, nine in 
Oceania, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 12 in Europe.  
MOFCOM data on foreign direct investment 
MOFCOM reported that “Chinese outward foreign direct investment surged from USD12.3 billion 
in 2005 to USD 123.12 billion in 2014” (according to Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9).  
Other estimates 
JICA Research Institute 
JICA Research Institute publishes estimates of China’s foreign aid for 2001-2015, to provide 
proxy estimates for China’s official development assistance as defined by the OECD DAC 
(Kitano, 2017; Kitano, 2016). The research covers disbursements of China’s foreign aid16, from 
the budget data from the websites of government departments and other relevant sources17 
(Kitano, 2016, p. 2). Net foreign aid is estimated at USD 5.4 billion in 2015, of which bilateral aid 
was 89 per cent and multilateral aid 11 per cent, with slightly more disbursed in concessional 
loans than grants and interest-free loans (Kitano, 2017). Net disbursements of preferential export 
buyer’s credits, which some countries treat as ODA, were an estimated USD 6.6 billion in 2015 
(Kitano, 2017). Not including the preferential export buyer’s credits, Kitano (2016, p.2) reports 
that “when compared with the net ODA flows of the top ten DAC member countries and 
emerging providers that report to the DAC plus Korea as an East Asian country, China was 
ranked at number 9 in 2015, next to Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands”.  
SAIS China Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI)18 
SAIS-CARI’s rigorous approach has compiled a database on Chinese concessional and 
commercial loans to Africa19. SAIS-CARI estimates that “from 2000 to 2015, the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 It is not clear if this is for the period 2010 to 2012 or in total all donations given up to 2012. 
15 Listed as: “the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the West African Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank” (State Council, 2014). 
16 Kitano (2016, p.8-9) defines this as ““(1) grants and interest-free loans managed by MOFCOM; (2) grants 
managed by other departments responsible for foreign aid; (3) scholarships provided by the Ministry of Education 
to students from other developing countries; (4) the estimated amount of interest subsidies on concessional loans 
which is deducted from the total amount of aid; (5) the net and gross disbursements of concessional loans as 
bilateral foreign aid; and (6) multilateral foreign aid, which is defined as the cumulative amount of expenditure by 
departments and other relevant organizations with a budget for international organizations, adjusted by the DAC-
defined coefficients for core contributions.” 
17 The figures for concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s credits are taken from published 
disbursement data for the China EximBank reported in the Almanac of China's Finance and Banking reports for 
each year, except for 2015; Kitano advises that the 2015 figures should be used with “considerable caution” 
(Kitano, 2017, p.1). 
18 Based at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C 
http://www.sais-cari.org/ 
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government, banks and contractors extended USD 94.4 billion worth of loans to African 
governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)” 20. Angola received the most, accounting for 
roughly a fifth of all Chinese loans. In 2015, the top recipients of Chinese loans were Uganda, 
Kenya, and Senegal.” Analysis of the SAIS-CARI data from 2000-2014 finds that the largest 
contribution to African loans is made by the EximBank (68 per cent); CDB accounts for the next 
largest share (16 per cent) (Hwang et al, 2016).21 
On commitments, Hwang et al (2016, p.3) note that loan commitments have been steadily 
increasing since 2000 (with a peak of commitments for Africa around the December 2015 Forum 
on China Africa Cooperation22). The researchers have doubts, however, that the commitments 
can be reached, given China’s recent economic slowdown and the impact of lower commodity 
prices in Africa among other reasons (p.3). 
AidData – Tracking Chinese Development Finance 
China AidData23 uses an open-source methodology for tracking under-reported financial flows24 
to create a database of Chinese official finance to Africa from 2000 to 2011 (Strange et al, 2017). 
Analysis of this data by Strange et al (2017) finds that China’s commitments to Africa between 
2000 and 2011 were USD 73 billion in official flows, of which USD 15 billion are comparable to 
ODA as defined by the OECD DAC. That USD 73 billion is “more than a fifth of the total OECD-
DAC flows (USD 361 billion) and almost as much as committed by the United States (USD 83 
billion)” to Africa over the same period. The USD 15 billion in ODA amounts to 4 per cent of total 
OECD-DAC ODA flows over the same period (USD 347 billion) and 19 per cent of those of the 
United States (USD 81 billion). The database includes 1,751 Chinese projects in fifty African 
countries. 52 per cent of projects are grants, accounted for only 10 per cent (USD 5.1 million) of 
the dollar amount tracked, and 23 per cent of the projects are classified as loans, loan 
guarantees, or export credits. Over the 2000–2011 period, Zimbabwe received the largest 
number of projects (101), followed by Ghana (67), and Ethiopia (63).  
Kitano and Harado (2016, p.1052) find that the AidData (and other) studies have provided useful 
research on China’s economic cooperation activities in Africa. They also highlight limitations. In 
particular they – and Hwang (2016) – caution the data may not be accurate or complete, and 
likely to overestimate due to the focus on commitments rather than disbursements.  
                                                                                                                                                              
19 See SAIS-CARI website for more information on their research methodology: http://www.sais-cari.org/data-
chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa  
20 http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa 
21 See the SAIS-CARI website http://www.ais-cari.org/data-chinese-and-american-fdi-to-africa/ and 
http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa and Hwang et al 2016 for a brief synopsis of the 
strengths and challenges of other trackers of Chinese aid and foreign investment (including China AidData and 
the China Global Investment Tracker – CGIT). 
22 These included pledges (among others) of USD 35 billion of concessional foreign aid loans, preferential loans, 
and non-preferential export credits plus USD 5 billion in grants and zero-interest loans over the next three years. 
23 http://china.aiddata.org/  
24 Through collecting project-level development finance information from the news media, scholarly research and 
government reports (Strange et al, 2017). 
11 
Disaggregated data for global geographical regions 
This rapid review has found it hard to identify data disaggregating China’s foreign aid and 
associated finance by global geographical region and/or countries’ income and development 
status.  
The Rand Corporation’s Wolf (2015) reports China’s pledged assistance of foreign aid and 
government-sponsored investment activities, which is estimated to average USD 174 billion a 
year during the previous six years. Wolf (2015) provides a breakdown for the regional shares of 
total pledged assistance from 2001 through 2014 (in billions): Africa (USD 330), Latin America 
(USD 298), East Asia (USD 192, excluding the bulk of China's aid to North Korea), the Middle 
East (USD 165), South Asia (USD 157), and Central Asia (USD 69). Precisely what type of 
finance is covered by this data is not clear, but Wolf (2015) specifies that this funding is 
principally provided by China's Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank25. 
The World Resources Institute estimates that “during the period 2004-2013, a large proportion of 
foreign direct investment was received by the global South, including Africa (14 per cent), Asia 
(31 per cent) and Latin America (5 per cent)” (Zhou and Leung, 2015; quote taken from 
Bohoslavsky, 2016, p.9). 
4. Drivers of aid and effect on China’s engagement 
Limited transparency and controversy 
Historically a net aid recipient, China has emerged over the past decade as a net donor, and is 
increasingly an important actor in international development assistance. This emerging role and 
the broader impact of its economic engagement overseas is the subject of considerable interest 
and debate both within and outside of China (Gu, 2015, p2). However, the decision-making 
process for China’s foreign aid remains a “black box” (Zhang et al, 2015, p.20). There is a lack of 
detailed information on the negotiation process between the Chinese government and recipients, 
and the interaction between the domestic aid institutions (p.20).  
A tool of foreign policy 
Perspectives on Chinese aid are often polarised (Gu, 2015, p. 2). It has been praised for 
efficiency and implementation and technology transfer capacity, with African governments 
disillusioned with the Western development model (Lue, 2014, p.37). Concurrently  China’s aid 
programme has received much criticism from the international development community and civil 
society for being “driven by the need for energy and raw materials” with a neglect of “human 
rights issues and governance in recipient countries” (p.37; Dreher et al, 2016).  
Others find the conventional wisdom that China gives aid to get access to resources is at best a 
partial and misleading answer; “ the reality is of course more nuanced” (Bräutigam, 2009, p.11; 
Gu, 2015, p.2). Rather, China’s aid can be seen, as with other donors, to be fundamentally a tool 
of foreign policy, driven by a mix of political, commercial and moral objectives (Bräutigam, 2009, 
p.15, 17). 
                                                   
25 Further explanation is available from Wolf et al (2013). 
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Dreher et al (2016, p.1) find that “much of the controversy about Chinese ‘aid’ stems from a 
failure to distinguish between China’s [official development assistance] and more commercially-
oriented … state financing”. Using the China AidData database, the allocation of Chinese aid 
from 2000-2013 is “driven primarily by foreign policy considerations, while economic interests 
better explain the distribution of less concessional flows” (Dreher et al, 2016, p.1).  
Gu et al (2015, p.1) also highlight that generalisations of whether Chinese aid is exploitative or 
developmental miss “the large gap between China’s policy and practice”, and the effect of 
recipient countries’ agency. Looking at Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo this 
analysis concludes that African actors’ negotiation of their engagement is “crucial in shaping the 
extent to which China contributes to development” (Gu et al, 2015, p.1). 
Historical context and geopolitics 
The literature highlights the influence of China’s own past experience as an aid and FDI recipient 
on the defining characteristics of its traditional aid programme (Bräutigam, 2009, p.18; Zhang et 
al, 2015, p.19). These include fairly consistent general principles – of equal treatment, respect for 
sovereignty, non-interference26 (one of the most controversial aspects of China’s foreign aid), 
mutual benefit and co-development – and a focus on giving aid to particular activities – 
infrastructure, production and university scholarships (Xue, 2014, p. 42; Bräutigam, 2009, p.11).  
Gu (2015, p.5) highlights the effect of “the geopolitics of China’s regional and global 
circumstances” and historical context. These include the historical legacies of semi-colonialism, 
aid, and the effects of top-down programmes such as Structural Adjustment Plans, influencing 
China’s perception of international development relations.  
Drivers of “Going out” inspired initiatives 
There is some analysis in the literature of the drivers of the increased aid and associated 
overseas economic engagement – including recent initiatives such as the One Belt, One Road 
initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – inspired by the ‘going out’ policy.  
According to Wang et al (2016, p.1), while “China’s going out policy is no doubt part of its overall 
more activist foreign policy … China’s domestic political economy has also been a major driving 
force”. They cite “the growing problems with the old growth model, the changing relationship 
between the government and state-owned enterprises and banks, and the public dissatisfaction 
with the government’s management of its foreign reserves” as all having contributed to the 
increase in outgoing FDI and aid programs. 
Dollar (2015, p.163-164) also identifies domestic economic conditions (including excess 
capacity) as driving China’s recent aid initiatives. He also highlights China’s frustrations with 
American-dominated multilateral institutions evolving their governance too slowly and not 
focusing – in the case of the World Bank – enough on infrastructure and growth (Dollar, 2015, 
p.163-164).  
                                                   
26 There is a large literature critically analysing the motives, implementation and changes in China’s 
understanding and implementation of this norm of non-interference. It is beyond the capacity of this rapid review 
to cover this topic fully in this paper. 
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Other analysis highlights Beijing’s use of such initiative as soft power vehicles to promote China’s 
image and legitimacy abroad (Shambaugh, 2015) (see discussion in later section on soft power). 
Domestic aid actors 
The domestic aid institutional set-up is complex and fragmented, with multiple state actors 
involved27 (Zhang and Smith, 2017, p.12). This mirrors the complexity of other donors’ 
arrangements (such as the US and France) (Bräutigam, 2009, p.116).  
Several analyses identify that Chinese aid is driven by internal competition among a wide array 
of actors, with its use hotly contested by competing actors’ varying agendas, rather than being a 
well-considered element of a coherent overarching strategy (Varrall, 2016; Zhang and Smith, 
2017, p.12). Studies highlight a power struggle between MFA and MOFCOM over foreign aid, 
with economic interests prominent with MOFCOM and political relations with MFA (Bräutigam, 
2009, p.111; Zhang et al, 2015, p.19). Zhang and Smith (2017, p.12) find that MFA, whose 
influence is often downplayed, has “a significant say on aid provision in the context of renewed 
diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan and the promotion of the post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals” (p.5,12). According to Zhang and Smith this explains why 
China sends large high-level delegations to small Pacific nations such as Tonga, while recipient 
country recognition of Mainland China rather than Taiwan is “a major factor behind the size and 
direction of Chinese aid flows” (p.6, 12). 
Gu et al (2016, p.1) find that “there is a need to shift focus beyond the level of the central state”, 
identifying that “the process of “going global” is driven significantly by China’s provinces”. Other 
key findings are that “Implementation of Chinese state policy is uneven, leaving policy lagging 
behind” and “Much Chinese state–business interaction in African agriculture is informal and 
decentralized” (Gu et al, 2016, p.1). Zhang and Smith (2017, p.12) also highlight the understated 
role of contractors in shaping China’s aid programme, finding that “the tail of China’s aid system 
often wags the dog, leading to an aid programme dominated by infrastructure projects backed by 
China Exim Bank’s concessional loan programme” . 
5. Sector involvement 
Humanitarian 
For decades China has provided small amounts of money and material aid in response to 
disasters, usually on a bilateral basis and not part of the budget for external assistance 
(Bräutigam, 2009, p.121-122). From the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami onwards China’s 
                                                   
27 Central institutions involved in aid are: 1) State Council with oversight and budget approval role; 2) Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM): the lead government agency responsible for China’s foreign aid; 3) Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) drafts and coordinates China’s foreign policy under the central government, and plays 
an advisory role on foreign aid; 4) Ministry of Finance (MOF): drafts the budget, allows donations to multilateral 
organisations, manages the cancellation of foreign aid debt owed to China, and signs off on annual aid plans; 5) 
China EximBank: plays a key role in “providing Chinese government concessionary loans, as well as promoting 
an open and export-oriented economy through trade financing” (Xue, 2014, p.39). Between 12 and 20 other 
ministries and agencies as well as Chinese embassies through the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s 
offices have some kind of role in foreign aid but meet rarely and report vertically (Brautigam, 2009, p.116; Xue, 
2014, p.39). Moreover “tens of thousands of Chinese enterprises, public and private; hospitals; educational 
institutions; NGOs; and other organisations are involved in on-the-ground delivery of aid projects in Africa” (Xue, 
2014, p.39). 
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humanitarian aid has “greatly increased” and is increasingly provided through multilateral 
organisations (p.122; Krebs, 2014). UNDP (2015) finds that since 2000 China has been one of 
the top five largest humanitarian aid providers among non-DAC countries, mainly providing relief 
materials, food, cash and rescue and medical teams, as well as post-disaster reconstruction and 
capacity building for disaster prevention. According to the 2014 White Paper, China provided 
USD 241 million in humanitarian aid to more than 30 countries in 2010-2012, accounting for 1.7 
per cent of its total aid (State Council, 2014; UNDP, 2015).  China is an active member of the UN 
Disaster Assessment and Coordination network and the International Search and Rescue 
Advisory Group (UNDP, 2015). China’s humanitarian aid is mainly provided through government 
channels, but Chinese NGOs have begun to increase and deepen their international 
engagement, in financing, delivery and training support (UNDP, 2015).  
Health 
China has been involved in overseas health assistance for decades and is starting to become a 
major global player in this sector (Bräutigam, 2009; Itad, 2017). An analysis of the AidData China 
to Africa Aid Database reports that from 2000 to 2012 China committed at least USD 3 billion to 
about 255 projects in health, population and water and sanitation sectors to 46 African countries 
(Grépin et al, 2014, p.4). Grépin et al conclude that China’s approach “represents an important 
and distinct source of financial assistance for health in Africa”, contrasting with traditional DAC 
donors with a focus on health system inputs and malaria.  
The most typical form of China’s health assistance has been Chinese medical teams (CMT);  
more than 64 developing countries and territories have hosted Chinese medical teams since the 
1960s (Bräutigam, 2009, p.117). Liu et al (2014) find that China has made rapid progress in key 
domains of global health, including prioritising the control of cross-border transmission of 
infectious diseases and other health-related risks;  joining UN and related international bodies 
and contributing to pooled multilateral funds; acting as knowledge producer and sharer on 
lessons on its health accomplishments and research investment in drug discovery (for example); 
and developing global health capital in China’s medical universities.  An evaluation by Itad (2017, 
p.1) highlights “seeds of change” in China’s commitment to (among others) engagement in global 
health governance, norm setting and research and commercial opportunities. However, they find 
limited clarity on the finance available and the forms of engagement. Lin et al (2016, p.2) found 
“a key limitation of China’s health aid approach is the absence of a cohesive approach and a 
coherent strategy of China’s health diplomacy”.  
Economic (including infrastructure financing)  
The 2014 White Paper lists China’s infrastructure assistance, including the construction of 
schools, health facilities, well-drilling and water supply, housing, construction of public cultural 
venues, sports venues, office buildings and conference centres. The White Paper also highlights 
China’s role in providing finance for infrastructure including for transport systems, energy supply 
capacity, and promoting the development of information-based societies. (State Council, 2014) 
For the period 2000-2014 Hwang et al (2016, p.2) find that the three largest sectors financed by 
Chinese commercial and concessional loans to Africa were transportation at USD 24.2 billion (28 
per cent), energy at USD 17.6 billion (20 per cent), and mining at USD 9.0 billion (10 per cent). 
Transportation loans commonly involve construction or renovation of roads, railways, airports 
and harbours, or the purchase of road/rail/air vehicles (p.2). 
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China’s President Xi Jinping’s signature  “One Road One Belt” initiative focuses on “China’s 
near-abroad and Eurasian neighbours through the Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as a 
New Silk Road Infrastructure fund, all with the aim of promoting greater economic integration 
and regional growth” (Gu, 2015, p.6). A 2016 KPMG report found that, according to 
information released by the Chinese Government, during 2015, contracting projects along the 
‘Belt and Road’ accounted for 45 per cent of Chinese contractors’ international revenue and 44 
per cent of the value of China’s newly signed contracts.  
Another important facet to China’s development assistance is the promotion of agricultural 
development. The 2014 White Paper states that “From 2010 to 2012, China assisted 49 
agricultural projects, dispatched over 1,000 agricultural experts to recipient countries, and 
provided them with a great quantity of machinery, improved varieties of grain, fertilizers and other 
agricultural materials” (State Council, 2014). Scoones et al (2016) find that Chinese development 
cooperation in Africa increasingly includes agriculture, involving agribusiness, contract farming, 
technology demonstration, and training. 
Socio-cultural (soft-power) 
Some analyses appear to view China’s foreign aid programme in its entirety as one of its soft 
power “tools” (Albert, 2017). There is talk of China’s “recent push” on soft power, with initiatives 
such as the One Belt One Road explicitly aimed by the China leadership to promote China’s 
image and legitimacy abroad (Shambaugh, 2015). In a study of China-Africa relations, Corkin 
(2014, p.49) finds that “Chinese concerns centre around the need to distinguish China from 
African countries' other partners and the importance of strengthening ‘soft power’ in the 
international community”, with Africa seen as a testing ground for such diplomatic 
experiments.  However, an earlier Chatham House paper cautions that while debates over 
Chinese soft power have increased in recent years, there has not been a shared definition of 
what ‘soft power’28 actually means (Breslin, 2011, p.2). As a result analyses purporting to be 
about soft power “often include a focus on economic relations and other material (hard) sources 
of power and influence” (Breslin, 2011, p.2). Breslin concludes that “it remains difficult to 
separate hard material factors from softer attraction to values and world-views”.  
Socio-cultural elements of Chinese assistance to developing countries includes since 2000 a 
training component, which focuses in part on transferring information about China’s own 
experience with urbanisation, economic growth, and poverty alleviation (Bräutigam, 2009, p.119). 
Other important ‘soft power’ components of China’s assistance have been scholarships for 
university study in China, and more recently the introduction of a Chinese youth volunteer corps, 
a first effort to send Chinese youth to assist in various development fields abroad (p.122-124). 
Trilateral assistance has also been identified as a “soft power” tool for China. Zhang (2017) 
examines China’s motivations for trilateral aid cooperation with western donors and UN 
agencies. Zhang argues that “strategically, China is putting growing emphasis on its identity as a 
growing great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to build its global 
image” (p.750). 
                                                   
28 According to one article, “soft power is a term coined by Harvard University scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr. in 1990, 
is the means by which a country gets other countries to “want what it wants.” Nye emphasized that a country’s 
perceived legitimacy, attractiveness of ideology and culture, and societal norms play an important role in shaping 
international politics.” (Albert, 2017)  
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